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Waiving Rights Goodbye:
Class Action Waivers
in Arbitration Agreements After
Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds
International
Diana M. Link & Richard A. Bales
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of arbitration as a means of alternative dispute resolution
has dramatically increased since the enactment of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) in 1925.' The Act represents a strong congressional policy in
favor of arbitration.2 In arbitration, parties contractually agree to submit
disputes to an arbitrator rather than pursuing them in court. Arbitration is
considered preferable in many situations because it is quicker, less
expensive, simpler, and less formal than the traditional judicial process.3
Despite all of these benefits, courts have experienced problems with some
specialized or uncommon issues that are not addressed by the FAA or prior
arbitration jurisprudence.
In particular, courts have been inconsistent in their interpretation of
arbitration agreements that prohibit parties from bringing class actions in
arbitration or in court.4 Class action waivers in arbitration agreements come
in a variety of forms. Many arbitration agreements prohibit any litigation in
court at all, which some courts have construed to necessarily preclude class
1. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006); 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute
Resolution § 91 (2010).
2. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (stating
that "Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements").
3. Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration
Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 255 (1987).
4. See generally Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Johnson v. West
Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3rd Cir. 2000); Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007);
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
275
1
Link and Bales: Waiving Rights Goodbye: Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agree
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2011
action certification in court.5 Other arbitration agreements expressly prohibit
class arbitration in addition to prohibiting any claims in court.6  The
inconsistencies among the language of class action waivers themselves may
be part of the reason courts have ruled inconsistently on their validity.
While some courts have held that section 2 of the FAA allows such
agreements to be disregarded under basic contract principles,7 other courts
have found that class mechanisms are merely procedural and can be waived
in a valid arbitration agreement. An April 2010 United States Supreme
Court case, Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., held that a
party to an arbitration agreement cannot be compelled to submit to class
arbitration unless there is some contractual basis demonstrating an intention
to do so.9
Rather than resolving the class arbitration issue, Stolt obfuscates it even
further. A main reason for the discrepancy among the courts may be the fact
that the FAA is silent on the issue of class actions in arbitration. 0 As a
result of this inconsistency, some parties with potentially valid claims have
been effectively foreclosed from bringing an action because of the costs and
risks associated with proceeding with an individual claim in a situation
where a class action would arguably be more appropriate."
This article first argues that to determine the enforceability of a class
action waiver, courts should take a "totality of the circumstances" approach
rather than adopting a bright-line rule. A set of defined factors that also
allows courts to consider real-world issues facing litigants will provide a
substantial framework for courts to interpret this area of the law and will
lead to more consistent and well-reasoned outcomes in the future. These
factors include: the probable size of each class member's individual
recovery, the potential for retaliation against class members, the awareness
of potential class members that their rights have been violated, and other
factors such as cost and convenience. 2 Second, this article argues that the
5. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 369-71.
6. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1103.
7. Id. at 1100; Kristian, 446 F.3d at 25; Gentry, 165 P.3d at 556.
8. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 366.
9. Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
10. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006). This
section of the FAA concerns arbitral procedure, but does not contain a provision regarding class
actions. It seems logical that if class actions were included in the Act, it would be in section 9.
11. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374-75 (in which the court acknowledges that class action is more
attractive to plaintiff, but denies relief by relying on the FAA's strong presumption in favor of
enforcing arbitration agreements).
12. See Gentry, 165 P.3d at 556.
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FAA should be amended to include a provision that directly addresses the
issues that arise surrounding class action arbitration and class action waivers.
Part II of this article provides a general background in the jurisprudence
of arbitration. The basic issues presented by the cases are (1) the
enforceability of class action waivers, and (2) whether or not statutory rights
arc adequately vindicated in the absence of a class mechanism. After
gaining an understanding of the judicial history of these two questions
separately, Part II then explores the varying decisions courts have reached
on class action issues in arbitration, including the recent Stolt decision.
Some courts have found class certification inappropriate, reasoning that
procession as a class is merely a procedural right that can be validly
waived." Other courts have held the opposite, arguing that although class
mechanisms are technically procedural, they have many substantive
implications and should be allowed in certain circumstances.14
Part III of this article argues that to synthesize these varying opinions
and find a way to move forward in a more consistent way, courts should
apply a set of several factors to determine whether to enforce a class action
waiver. This method will allow courts to reach a well-reasoned result that is
still within the limits of previous courts' decisions and the directives of the
FAA.' 5
Part IV of this article proposes an amendment to the FAA that will
resolve the issues that surround class action arbitration and provide courts
with a statutory basis for future decisions. Before this, however, it is
important to understand the way courts determine the enforceability of
arbitration agreements and, more specifically, the arbitrability of statutory
claims.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Common-Law Interpretation ofFAA Section 2
The FAA was enacted in 1925.16 As a holdover from the English
common law courts that disfavored arbitration agreements, American courts
had also disfavored arbitration agreements before the enactment of the
13. See, e.g., Johnson, 225 F.3d at 366.
14. See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Discover Bank, 113 P.3d
at I100.
15. See Gentry, 165 P.3d at 556.
16. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
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FAA.' 7 With the enactment of the FAA, and particularly section 2 of the
Act, came a congressionally mandated policy in favor of enforcing
arbitration agreements.' 8 However, like any contract, not all agreements to
arbitrate pass muster under state contract law principles. The text of section
2 of the Act states: "An agreement in writing to submit to arbitration ...
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, [as a matter of federal law] save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 9
The Supreme Court's opinion in Perry v. Thomas succinctly defines
when courts should and should not enforce agreements to arbitrate.20 Perry
interprets section 2 of the Act to mean two things. First, any state law,
judge-made or statutory, that concerns the "validity, revocability and
enforceability of contracts generally" may be used to invalidate an
arbitration agreement.2' Second, any state law that is specifically aimed at
arbitration agreements (as opposed to all contracts generally) may not be
used to abrogate or invalidate an arbitration agreement that would otherwise
be valid.22 The first holding of Perry requires that arbitration agreements be
interpreted the same as all other contracts, and permits them to be voidable
under such state-law principles as unconscionability, duress, fraud, and
23coercion. The second holding is based on the constitutional principle of
preemption, which requires that the federally enacted FAA preempts any
state law that may conflict with it.24
At the time the FAA was enacted, class action litigation was not a
common method for resolving disputes, and presumably for that reason, the
FAA contains no provision expressly regarding class action in an arbitration
context. 25
B. Arbitrability of Statutory Claims Generally
Each of the cases presented in this article are based on a statutory claim
arising under an arbitration agreement. In each case, the litigants argue that
these statutory claims cannot be properly resolved absent a class mechanism.
17. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 22 (1991).
18. Federal Arbitration Act § 1.
19. Federal Arbitration Act § 2 (emphasis added).
20. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
21. Id. at 492 & n.3.
22. Id.
23. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); Perry, 482 U.S. at
492.
24. Perry, 482 U.S. at 484.
25. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).
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Therefore, the cases generally pose a twofold inquiry: (1) Is the class action
waiver contained in the agreement valid and enforceable?; and (2) Will
statutory rights be vindicated as completely on an individual basis as in a
class action? To fully understand the holdings of the cases in this article, a
background in the arbitrability of statutory claims in general is necessary.
Before arbitration became as widespread as it is today, there was some
question as to whether the FAA applied only to non-statutory contract
claims.26 The Supreme Court has held on several occasions that the FAA
does not prevent parties from arbitrating statutory claims. 27  Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation provides a summary of the state of the
law on this subject.
Gilmer, a 1991 United States Supreme Court case, determined that
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) are
arbitrable.28 Interstate Johnson/Lane Corporation hired Robert Gilmer as a
Manager of Financial Services in 1981.29 Upon being hired, Gilmer
registered with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as a securities
representative. 30  His registration with the NYSE contained a clause that
provided for arbitration of "any controversy between a registered
representative and any member or member organization arising out of the
employment or termination of employment of such registered
representative."3' Johnson/Lane Corporation subsequently fired Gilmer in
1987 at the age of sixty-two.32
In response, Gilmer filed an age discrimination claim with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and thereafter brought suit
in United States District Court alleging age discrimination in violation of the
ADEA, and seeking to avoid the arbitration agreement for several reasons.
26. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
27. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
28. Id. at 23.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 27, 30-33 (finding arbitration inconsistent with the statutory framework of the
ADEA; the ADEA is meant to further important social policies; discovery is inadequate in
arbitration; arbitration panels will be biased; lack of public knowledge because arbitrators do not
issue written opinions; judicial review is too limited; arbitration does not allow broad equitable relief
and class actions; and unequal bargaining power exists between employers and employees).
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Gilmer made two main arguments. First, he argued that arbitration is
inconsistent with the statutory framework of the ADEA.34 Second, he
argued that the ADEA was enacted to further important social policies,
which would not be served if claims were arbitrated rather than heard in
court.'
Before this case came to the Supreme Court, United States Courts of
Appeals were split in their opinions of Gilmer's first claim regarding the
legislative intent and history of the ADEA. Gilmer argued that the ADEA
protects claimants from waiving a judicial forum in favor of arbitration. In
consideration of Gilmer's first argument, the Court noted the long history of
judicial distaste for arbitration agreements dating back to English common
law and carrying over into the United States. The Court emphasized that
the FAA was enacted to combat this judicial distaste and to "place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." 39 After
summarizing the history of its opinions on the particular issue of the
arbitrability of statutory claims, the Court found no compelling reason why
statutory rights could not be vindicated in an arbitral forum just as well as in
a court.40
Based on a prior holding on the issue, the Court determined that no
substantive rights are lost when a statutory claim is arbitrated rather than
heard in a court, and that if Congress intended for certain or all statutory
claims not to be arbitrated that intent would be evident in the text and
legislative history of the particular statute or the FAA.41 In applying this
rule, the Court placed the burden of proof on Gilmer to establish that
legislative intent or history precluded a waiver of a judicial forum for ADEA
claims.42 The Court concluded that Gilmer did not meet this burden, and
that therefore his ADEA claim was properly arbitrated.43
Gilmer's second argument was that the ADEA was enacted to "further
important social policies."" Gilmer argued that if his ADEA claim had been
heard in an arbitral forum rather than in court, the decision would not have
34. Id. at 23.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 24.
37. See generally id. at 33.
38. Id. at 24.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 26.
41. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 27.
44. Id.
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its intended social policy impact in reaching others who were discriminated
against and setting future precedent for cases like his.45 However, the Court
found that the distinction between a statute's social purposes and
adjudicating private grievances was irrelevant for purposes of determining
whether or not to enforce an agreement to arbitrate because no inconsistency
existed between the two purposes. 46 The Court reasoned that agreements to
arbitrate should be upheld whenever they are validly entered into and as long
as arbitration allows rights to be fully vindicated.47 In so holding, the Court
determined that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate
[his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.""8  The Court
ultimately determined that the public policy purposes of a statute should be
considered subordinate to individual vindication of rights so long as the two
do not conflict. 49
Gilmer is often cited in cases interpreting agreements to arbitrate
statutory claims. There are two main holdings of Gilmer for purposes of
later interpretation by courts. First, when a right conferred upon citizens by
a statute is capable of being vindicated by arbitration, there is no public
policy to support a refusal by the court to uphold an arbitration agreement.50
Second, even though a statute may have social policy implications which
might be more appropriately heard in court, a valid agreement to arbitrate
will be upheld as long as litigants' individual rights will be fully vindicated
in the arbitral forum regardless of any social policy purposes that may not be
as well-served.
C. The Pre-Stolt Split
In determining the enforceability of class action waivers, courts have
been inconsistent in their holdings as well as their reasoning. Some courts
have taken the stance that class mechanisms are purely procedural and have
45. Id. at 27-28.
46. Id. at 27.
47. Id. at 28 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 (1985)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id. at 28.
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no bearing on the full vindication of litigants' rights.52 This group reasons
that the right to proceed as a class can be waived in a valid agreement to
arbitrate. Other courts have held that class mechanisms have significant
substantive implications and that litigants' right to bring an action may be
completely foreclosed absent a class mechanism. 5 4 The main difference
between the two groups is the courts' interpretations of the role class
mechanisms play in the vindication of rights.
1. Denial of Class Certification
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied class certification in the 2000
case Johnson v. West Suburban Bank."5 In Johnson, the court determined
under the principles announced in Gilmer that a claim arising from the Truth
in Lending Act (TILA) was arbitrable and that the arbitration agreement at
issue necessarily precluded the right to proceed as a class.56 Terry Johnson
procured a short-term loan from the County Bank of Rehoboth Beach. The
loan was for $250, but included a finance charge of $88, which constituted
an annual percentage rate of 917% and was undisclosed by the bank in an
alleged violation of the TILA." Johnson sought to bring a class action suit
in court against County Bank of Rehoboth Beach and other defendants who
were engaging in similar practices.59  The defendants responded that the
claim was required to be arbitrated under the agreement Johnson signed
when he procured the loan.60 The agreement provided in pertinent part:
"NOTICE: YOU AND WE WOULD HAVE HAD A RIGHT OR
OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE DISPUTES THROUGH A COURT BUT
HAVE AGREED INSTEAD TO RESOLVE DISPUTES THROUGH
BINDING ARBITRATION." 6 1
The main issue before the court was whether Johnson's statutory claims
could be arbitrated when he was seeking to bring a class action in court on
behalf of multiple claimants.62 Johnson's main arguments echoed those
52. See Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 378 (3rd Cir. 2000).
53. Id.
54. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Gentry v. Superior Court, 165
P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
55. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 366.
56. Id. at 369.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 370.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 368-69.
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made by Gilmer.6 ' His first argument was that the statutory framework of
the TILA inherently conflicted with arbitration, and therefore his statutory
rights under the TILA could not be vindicated in an arbitral forum.6
Second, Johnson argued that the TILA's public policy goals precluded
enforcement of the arbitration agreement.65
Johnson's first argument rested on a portion of the TILA that
specifically mentions class actions as a method of enforcement. 66 Based on
this provision, Johnson argued that an inherent conflict existed between the
arbitration agreement, which prohibited any type of litigation in court, and
the TILA, which specifically mentioned class action litigation. In
considering his argument, the court first recognized that Johnson's claim
was one of first impression in federal courts.6' The court then noted that the
arbitration agreement itself did not explicitly deny class actions, either in
arbitration or in court.69 However, relying on the strong preference for
arbitration expressed in Gilmer, the court determined that even though the
arbitration agreement made no mention of class actions, it necessarily
prohibited them because it required all claims to be submitted to
arbitration. 0
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court held that statutory claims are generally
arbitrable unless it appears from an analysis of the text and legislative
history or an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's purposes
that Congress intended particular statutory claims not to be arbitrable.'
Therefore, the court in Johnson concluded that if Johnson were to prevail in
his attempt to avoid the arbitration agreement, it would have to be based
upon a finding that there was an inherent conflict between the purposes of
the TILA and the arbitration of claims under the Act.72
To determine if there was an inherent conflict, the court analyzed the
statutory language and legislative intent, noting that the TILA specifically
63. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991).
64. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 368.
65. Id. at 369.
66. Id. at 371 (stating that "the statute specifically addresses the damages available in a class
action, limiting the maximum potential recovery").
67. Id. at 368.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 370-71.
71. Id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)).
72. Id. at 371.
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mentions class actions in at least one place.73 However, the court narrowly
interpreted the statutory language to find that even though the statute
referentially mentioned class actions, it did not explicitly state that TILA
claimants had any particular right to proceed on a class basis. To
demonstrate legislative intent, Johnson produced a Senate committee report
on the TILA that expressed concerns that recovery caps might be set too low
for class actions, thus frustrating the enforcement of the statute. Johnson
argued that this report proved the "centrality of class actions to the TILA's
effective enforcement."76 The court disagreed, finding no legislative intent
to exempt class action TILA claims from the force of the FAA. Although
the court noted that the Senate report did promote class actions as a TILA
enforcement mechanism, the report fell "short of demonstrating
irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and the TILA."" The court
determined that although Congress may have intended for class actions to be
a method of enforcement of the TILA, equal weight should also be given to
Congress's intent in enacting the FAA that all valid arbitration agreements
be enforced in their terms.79 The court then extended its interpretation to
find that the class action mechanism is merely a procedural right and not one
that is related to the vindication of claims arising under the TILA.so
Next, the court considered Johnson's second claim that the public policy
goals of the TILA required the availability of class action litigation.
Johnson argued that because there are frequently minimal actual damages
suffered by consumers in schemes like defendants', the goal of the TILA is
not exclusively to reimburse individual consumers, but to discourage unfair
credit practices in general.82 Johnson further argued that the TILA as a
whole was enacted for public policy purposes rather than to address private
grievances. 3 Johnson's arguments, while forceful, were ultimately unable
to persuade the court that class actions were necessary to the remedial and
deterrent goals of the TILA.84 The court relied exclusively on Gilmer to
73. Id. (stating that "the statute specifically addresses the damages available in a class action,
limiting the maximum potential recovery").
74. Id.
75. Id. at 372-73.
76. Id. at 373.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 376.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 369.
82. Id. at 373.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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determine that all of Johnson's claims about the public policy of the statute
were foreclosed. The court provided further support for its decision by
citing to a TILA provision that allowed for administrative enforcement of
TILA violations by the Federal Trade Commission.
In a short footnote based on the case Champ v. Siegel Trading Co.,87 the
Johnson court determined that class actions could not be pursued in arbitral
forums unless the arbitration agreement contemplated it. The court came
to this conclusion despite acknowledging that the Third Circuit had never
addressed whether class arbitration could be pursued in a situation like
Johnson's.89
This case presents an overwhelmingly strong preference for arbitration
and a very narrow interpretation of both the statute and arbitration clause at
issue. This case relies heavily on prior decisions without engaging in much
original analysis. Although the issues remain largely the same throughout
the circuit split, the next set of cases demonstrates the ways other courts
have decided them.
2. Allowance of Class Action
The California Supreme Court and the First Circuit Court of Appeals
have taken a different approach than the Johnson court when considering
class action waivers in arbitration agreements.90  These courts have
invalidated class action waivers by relying on state contract principles and
the important substantive implications of class mechanisms to the full
vindication of statutory rights.
a. Allowance of Class Arbitration Founded Upon State Contract
Principles
The California Supreme Court decided Discover Bank v. Superior Court
in 2005.9' In Discover Bank, the court invalidated a class action waiver
85. Id. at 374.
86. Id. at 375.
87. Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274-75 (7th Cir. 1995).
88. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 377.
89. Id.
90. See generally Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Gentry v. Superior
Court, 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
91. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1100.
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contained in an arbitration agreement based upon state contract principles.92
The case involved a claim under the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act and a
challenge to the validity of an arbitration agreement between Discover and
its cardholders that purported to completely bar any arbitration as a class.
The arbitration agreement said: "NEITHER YOU NOR WE SHALL BE
ENTITLED TO JOIN OR CONSOLIDATE CLAIMS IN ARBITRATION
BY OR AGAINST OTHER CARDMEMBERS WITH RESPECT TO
OTHER ACCOUNTS, OR ARBITRATE ANY CLAIM AS A
REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF A CLASS OR IN A PRIVATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL CAPACITY."94 The plaintiff cardholders alleged
that Discover was engaging in a deceptive practice with regard to the
imposition of late fees upon all cardholders. 95 Each cardholder suffered a
minimal amount of damage as a result of this practice, but Discover profited
greatly in the aggregate.96 For this reason, the plaintiffs sought to pursue
classwide arbitration despite the arbitration agreement that expressly forbade
class arbitration.
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the class action waiver was
invalid, and provided three reasons for this ruling.98 First, the court found
that the class action waiver was both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable.99 Second, the court cited to a California statute that
prohibits any party to a contract from immunizing itself from liability. 00
Third, the court distinguished its holding from those of Johnson and Gilmer
by noting the serious substantive implications of class mechanisms.' 0'
First, in its determination that the class action waiver was
unconscionable, the court looked to the then-recent California Court of
Appeals decision in Szetela v. Discover Bank.102 The facts in Szetela were
essentially identical to the facts of Discover Bank.03 The Szetela court held
a class action waiver unenforceable on grounds of procedural and
substantive unconscionability.1'4 Procedural unconscionability existed
92. Id. at 1103.
93. Id at 1103-04.
94. Id at 1103.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id
98. Id at 1104.
99. Id. at i107.
100. Id at 1108.
101. Id. at 1113-14.
102. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
103. Discover Bank, i13 P.3d at i104.
104. Id. at 1107 (citing Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867).
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because the class waiver was contained in a contract of adhesion.os
Substantive unconscionability existed because the class action waiver was
one-sided and oppressive to the consumer.106 The court noted that in both
cases, Discover's class arbitration waiver provision was not the two-sided
agreement that it purported to be; it would be difficult to imagine a scenario
when credit card companies proceeded together as a class to sue their
cardholders.' For this reason, it was apparent that by including the class
arbitration waiver, Discover intended to effectively immunize itself from
liability for any number of offenses it might commit against its
cardholders.' The court reasoned that by imposing the class action waiver
on its customers, Discover had essentially "granted itself a license to push
the boundaries of good business practices to their furthest limits, fully aware
that relatively few, if any, customers will seek legal remedies, and that any
remedies obtained will only pertain to that single customer without collateral
estoppel effect."' 09
Second, the Discover Bank court relied on California Civil Code
section 1668 to invalidate the class arbitration waiver."o Section 1668
provides that "[a]ll contracts which have for their object, directly or
indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful
injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law, whether
willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.""' The court found
invalidation to be acceptable under the FAA section 2, which disavows any
arbitration agreements that violate principles of state contract law.1 2 Even
though the FAA requires the arbitration agreements' terms to be enforced,
enforcement is limited by basic contract principles that would invalidate any
contract.1 3 Under the principles of Perry, if California Civil Code section
1668 pertained solely to arbitration agreements, the FAA would preempt
it. 114 But because it applies to all contracts, arbitration agreements or
otherwise, section 1668 constitutes a general state contract law for purposes
105. Id. (citing Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867).
106. Id. (citing Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867).
107. Id. at 1109.
108. Id. at 1107-08.
109. Id at I108.
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (2010)).
112. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
113. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110.
114. Id. at l l7.
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of section 2 of the FAA."' The court was careful to limit this holding by
ensuring that not every class arbitration waiver is presumptively invalid, but
"[s]uch one-sided, exculpatory contracts in a contract of adhesion, at least to
the extent [that] they operate to insulate a party from liability that otherwise
would be imposed under California law, are generally unconscionable."' 16
Third, the court distinguished its holding in Discover Bank from the
opinions in Johnson and Gilmer.'"7 In its discussion of the Johnson holding,
the court found that the substantive implications of proceeding as a class
were largely ignored and that the Johnson court focused too much on the
procedural aspect of class actions."'8 The Discover Bank court disagreed
with the Johnson rationale, finding that "[a]ffixing the 'procedural' label on
such devices understates their importance and is not helpful in resolving the
unconscionability issue."" 9  In distinguishing its holding from that in
Gilmer, the court relied upon a few key factual differences between the
statutes at issue in the two cases.120 The court found that claims such as
Gilmer's under the ADEA commonly proceed on an individual basis with
large awards. 121 In contrast, consumer fraud claims such as those made in
Discover Bank almost never proceed on an individual basis because
individual damages are simply not large enough to make up for the
extremely high litigation costs associated with such complex claims.12 2 In
making its comparison between the two situations, the court concluded,
"classwide arbitration is only justified when 'gross unfairness would result
from the denial of opportunity to proceed on a classwide basis."'l
2 3
Gilmer's claim under the ADEA did not present the circumstances of "gross
unfaimess" that the court considered to be present in the consumer fraud
case of Discover Bank. 24
In sum, the Discover Bank court based its holding mainly on state
contract principles espoused in both case law and in the California Civil
Code.125 The Discover Bank court also emphasized the serious substantive
implications of a class mechanism in a consumer credit context where each
115. Id.
116. Id at 1109.
117. Id. at 1109,1113-14.
118. Id at 1109.
119. Id
120. Id. at 1113-14.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1107-08.
123. Id. at 1113 (quoting Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982)).
124. Id
125. Id. at 1108.
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claimant suffers only minimal damages and the incentive to bring individual
suit is low because of high litigation costs and low damage awards.126
b. Severing Class Action Waiver and Allowing Class Arbitration
The next case represents a slightly different method that courts have
employed to invalidate class action waivers. This case applied the principles
of Discover Bank and expanded them to include an analysis based on the full
vindication of statutory rights on a class action versus an individual basis.17
The First Circuit Court of Appeals decided Kristian v. Comcast Corp. in
2006.128 The Kristian court severed a class action waiver based on a
"vindication of statutory rights" framework. 129
Kristian concerned the validity of an arbitration agreement that was
provided as an insert enclosed with the bills of Comcast subscribers in the
Boston area.130 The provision of the arbitration agreement, which waived
the right to proceed as a class, read as follows:
THERE SHALL BE NO RIGHT OR AUTHORITY FOR ANY CLAIMS TO BE
ARBITRATED ON A CLASS ACTION OR CONSOLIDATED BASIS OR ON BASES
INVOLVING CLAIMS BROUGHT IN A PURPORTED REPRESENTATIVE
CAPACITY ON BEHALF OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SUCH AS A PRIVATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL), OTHER SUBSCRIBERS, OR OTHER PERSONS
SIMILARLY SITUATED UNLESS YOUR STATE'S LAWS PROVIDE
OTHERWISE. 13 1
The complaints alleged that Comcast was involved in anticompetitive
practices perpetrated via "swapping agreements" in which cable companies
traded territories, effectively eliminating competition in certain geographical
areas. 132 The plaintiffs sought to bring a class action in state court alleging
violations of public policy and unconscionability, and in federal court under
federal antitrust law. 133
The plaintiffs argued that the arbitration agreement in the bill stuffer
prevented them from vindicating their statutory rights because it did not
126. Id. at 1107-08.
127. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 53-64 (1st Cir. 2006).
128. See generally id.
129. Id. at 64.
130. Id. at 30.
131. Id. at 53.
132. Id. at 29-31.
133. Id. at 31.
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allow for a class mechanism.13 4 The court agreed with the plaintiffs, giving
three reasons for their invalidation of the class action waiver under a
"vindication of statutory rights" framework. First, the court stressed the
substantive implications of class action mechanisms.1 5  Second, the court
distinguished the Kristian case from the holding in Johnson.' 6 Third, the
court applied the principles of Discover Bank to its "vindication of statutory
rights" framework. 37  Based on this analysis, the court determined that
severance of the class arbitration waiver was appropriate.' 38
First, in its determination that class mechanisms have important
substantive implications, the court addressed Comcast's argument that class
mechanisms are a procedural rather than a substantive right and thus are
capable of being validly waived.13 9 In response to Comcast's arguments, the
court turned to the vindication of rights analysis and cited several cases in
support of the proposition that in certain circumstances, in the absence of a
class mechanism, no injured parties will proceed on an individual basis.140
The court noted that the reason for having a class mechanism in place is to
address situations in which numerous plaintiffs each have small damages
and therefore lack incentive to bring an action on their own, but when
grouped together can effectively vindicate their rights.14' The court quoted
famous language from Carnegie v. Household International, Inc., which
bluntly stated, "only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.00."l142 The court
gave some credence to Comcast's argument that class actions are a
procedural mechanism but ultimately concluded that the substantive
implications of the technically procedural class mechanism could not be
ignored.14 3  The court compared each individual Comcast subscriber's
recovery of a few hundred to a few thousand dollars to the fees for attorneys
and expert witnesses in such a case, which it estimated could go into the
millions.'" This comparison brought the court to the conclusion that "the
134. Id. at 37 (stating that "arbitration agreements prevent them from vindicating their statutory
rights because the agreements: (1) provide for limited discovery; (2) establish a shortened statute of
limitations period; (3) bar recovery of treble damages; (4) prevent recovery of attorney's fees; and
(5) prohibit the use of class mechanisms").
135. Id. at 55.
136. Id. at 56-57.
137. Id. at 60-61.
138. Id. at 64.
139. Id at 54.
140. Id. (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997)).
141. Id. (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617).
142. Id. (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 1997)).
143. See id.
144. Id.
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class mechanism ban-'particularly its implicit ban on spreading across
multiple plaintiffs the costs of experts, depositions, neutrals' fees, and other
disbursements'-forces the putative class member to assume financial
burdens so prohibitive as to deter the bringing of claims .... 145
Second, the court acknowledged that the Third Circuit upheld an
arbitration agreement that waived class actions in Johnson v. West Suburban
Bank, but distinguished its Kristian holding in three ways. 146 First, the court
noted that the statutes involved were different, and the importance of a class
mechanism to the vindication of rights under federal antitrust law is far
greater than under the TILA.147  Second, the Johnson court relied on the
availability of attorney's fees as an incentive to bring individual claims
under the TILA, however, in the federal antitrust context attorney's fees can
reach into the millions and it would be extremely unlikely for an attorney to
be able to justify full recovery of those fees if the plaintiff's award was only
in the hundreds or thousands of dollars.148 Third, the court in Johnson relied
on the administrative enforcement provisions of the TILA to justify its
holding that private enforcement via class actions were to be prohibited.149
The Kristian court spoke to this point in the federal antitrust context by
finding that "Congress envisions a role for both types of enforcement.
Otherwise, Congress would not have provided for both. Weakening one of
those enforcement mechanisms seems inconsistent with the Congressional
scheme. Eliminating one of them entirely is surely incompatible with
Congress' choice.
The Kristian court's third reason for invalidating the class action waiver
was that the plaintiffs' statutory rights could not be completely vindicated in
the absence of a class mechanism.'51 This reasoning was based on an
application of the "vindication of statutory rights" analysis to the principles
announced in Discover Bank. The court quoted Discover Bank in support of
its finding that class arbitration should be allowed: "[C]lass actions and
arbitrations are, particularly in the consumer context, often inextricably
linked to the vindication of substantive rights."'5 2 In its application of the
145. Id. at 55.
146. Id at 56-57.
147. Id at 58.
148. Id. at 58-59.
149. See id. at 59.
150. Id.
151. Seeidat60.
152. Id. at 60 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109 (Cal. 2005)).
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principles laid out the year before in Discover Bank, the court ultimately
found that if the class action waiver were to be enforced, Comcast would
effectively avoid liability for offenses perpetrated against all of its
customers.153 The court found that without a class mechanism, plaintiffs'
rights would not be vindicated and the goals of the federal antitrust laws
would be frustrated by the "'enforcement gap' created by the de facto
liability shield."l 54 The court noted that although its analysis was based on a
"vindication of statutory rights" framework, it would have been identical if it
had proceeded on a state law unconscionability basis, as the court in
Discover Bank did.15' The class action waiver in Discover Bank was
unconscionable because it prevented the plaintiffs from vindicating their
statutory rights. 56
After explaining its reasons for invalidating the class action waiver, the
court determined whether the entire arbitration agreement should be
invalidated or if the offending clause could be severed.15  The court found
that the last sentence of the class arbitration waiver, "UNLESS YOUR
STATE'S LAWS PROVIDE OTHERWISE," allowed for that portion of the
clause to be invalidated and severed from the rest of the arbitration
agreement.158 The court acknowledged a judicial preference of either wholly
invalidating contracts or enforcing them in all their terms and general
judicial hesitance to sever agreements because they do not want to re-write
the private contracts of the parties.'59 The court here found severance of the
class waiver permissible because of the savings clause in the last line that
provided for the severance of provisions not in accordance with state law.'60
Thus, the court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed as a class in the arbitral
forum rather than in court, upholding as much of the arbitration agreement
as was consistent with the law. 61
c. A Multi-Factor Analysis for Determining Enforceability of Class
Action Waivers
A recent case concerning the issue of class action waivers provided a
multi-factor analysis that synthesized the various holdings of the other cases
153. See id. at 61.
154. Id.
155. See id at 63-64.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 61-62.
158. Id
159. Id. at 62.
160. Id. at 62-63.
161. Id. at 63.
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in the split. In the 2007 case of Gentry v. Superior Court, the California
Supreme Court applied a four-factor analysis to determine the validity of a
class action waiver.'62  These factors include: (1) potentially modest
individual recoveries, (2) the possibility of retaliation against class members,
(3) the fact that some potential class members may not even know their
rights were abridged, and (4) "other real world obstacles to the vindication
of class members' right[s]."l 63 This case differs from the others presented in
this article because it arose in an employment contract rather than a
consumer fraud context. Gentry involved an employment contract between
Robert Gentry and his employer, Circuit City" 4 Gentry sought to proceed
in arbitration to recover overtime pay from Circuit City with a class of
workers similarly situated.' 5 The arbitration agreement that Gentry signed
when he began employment forbade such proceedings, stating, "The
Arbitrator shall not consolidate claims of different Associates into one
proceeding, nor shall the Arbitrator have the power to hear arbitration as a
class action." 66
In determining whether to enforce the class action waiver at issue, the
Gentry court identified four factors that should be considered.' The court
explained that if, in light of the factors, class arbitration would be more
effective at vindicating the rights of employees than individual arbitration,
the waiver should not be enforced.16 8 The court deduced that the four most
important factors in determining the validity of a class action waiver were:
(1) potentially modest individual recoveries, (2) the possibility that Circuit
City would retaliate against class members, (3) the fact that some Circuit
City employees may not even know their rights were abridged, and (4)
"other real world obstacles to the vindication of class members' right[s]."l69
After analyzing each factor individually, the court concluded that the class
action waiver was procedurally unconscionable.170 Gentry was decided very
soon after Discover Bank, and it applied largely the same framework as
162. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 558 (Cal. 2007).
163. Id. at 568.
164. Id. at 559.
165. Id
166. Id. at 560.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 568.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 560-62.
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Discover Bank to hold the waiver procedurally unconscionable.17 ' The
California Supreme Court then remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to
determine whether or not the class action waiver was substantively
unconscionable. 72
D. The Supreme Court's Stolt Decision
The United States Supreme Court decided Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds
International Corp. on April 27, 2010.'"7 In a 5-3 decision with Justice
Sotomayor not participating, Stolt held that a party to an arbitration
agreement cannot be compelled to submit to class arbitration unless the
arbitration agreement itself demonstrates an intent to do so. 174 The case
involved a dispute between a shipping company, Stolt-Nielsen, and one of
its customers, AnimalFeeds International.'17  AnimalFeeds alleged that Stolt-
Nielsen was engaging in an illegal price-fixing conspiracy. 176  When
contracting to ship its goods with Stolt-Nielsen, AnimalFeeds signed a
standard shipping contract which contained an arbitration clause. 7  The
contract and the arbitration clause were governed by maritime law, and both
parties stipulated that the arbitration clause was silent on the issue of class
actions.17 8
In 2005, AnimalFeeds served Stolt-Nielsen with a demand for class
arbitration.179 The demand was thereafter submitted to a panel of arbitrators
to determine whether the arbitration clause allowed for class arbitration. 80
The panel determined that nothing in the arbitration clause demonstrated an
intent to preclude class arbitration, and that arbitration therefore was
allowed.18 ' The arbitrators then stayed the proceedings so Stolt-Nielsen
could seek judicial review of the arbitrators' decision in the Southern
District of New York; eventually, that court vacated the arbitrators' decision
based on the conclusion that the decision was made in manifest disregard of
federal maritime law.182 The court reasoned that contracts under maritime
171. Id. at 560.
172. Id. at 575.
173. Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
174. Id. at 1775.
175. Id. at 1764.
176. Id. at 1765.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1766.
179. Id. at 1765.
180. Id. at 1766.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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law should be construed under trade "custom and usage" and that there was
no custom or usage of class arbitration in maritime law.183 AnimalFeeds
then appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed,
concluding that there was no custom or usage in maritime law against class
arbitration and thus the arbitrators did not disregard maritime law. 184 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "whether imposing class
arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses are 'silent' on that issue is
consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act."185
In answering "no" to that question, Justice Alito, writing for the Court,
stressed two unique facts of the case before it and ultimately concluded that
the arbitrators' decision was "fundamentally at war with the foundational
FAA principle that arbitration is a matter of consent." 86 The first fact the
court stressed was that the contract at issue was governed by the "custom
and usage" of maritime law.187 This was the same point that the Southern
District of New York relied on to vacate the arbitrators' decision.188 The
Supreme Court agreed with the Southern District of New York in its finding
that there was no custom and usage of class arbitration in maritime
arbitration agreements.189 The second fact the court relied upon to deny
class arbitration was that both parties were sophisticated business entities.'90
To support its conclusion that the FAA principle of consent is
fundamentally at odds with requiring a party to submit to class arbitration in
absence of a contractual basis for doing so, the Court noted three key
differences between bilateral and class arbitration.19 ' First, the Court
pointed out that class arbitration resolves disputes between many parties
instead of only two.192 Second, class arbitration does not provide the same
presumption of "privacy and confidentiality" that bilateral arbitration
does.193  Third, class arbitration binds not only the two parties to the
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1764.
186. Id. at 1775.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id
190. Id
191. Id. at 1776.
192. Id.
193. Id
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contested agreement, but other absent parties as well. 194  The Court
concluded that these differences were too great for "arbitrators to presume,
consistent with their limited powers under the FAA, that the parties' mere
silence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve
their disputes in class proceedings."' 95 Despite this conclusion, the Court
noted that its decision did not determine precisely what contractual basis
would support a conclusion that the parties had agreed to class arbitration.196
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, dissenting,
argued that "[w]hen adjudication is costly and individual claims are no more
than modest in size, class proceedings may be 'the thing' i.e., without them,
potential claimants will have little, if any, incentive to seek vindication of
their rights."' 97 She then pointed out two "stopping points" in the majority's
holding.'" First, the Court did not require an express contractual
authorization of class action arbitration.199 Second, by noting that the parties
in this case were sophisticated business entities, the Court apparently spared
consumer contracts of adhesion from its holding.2 oo
Although this case did not concern a class arbitration waiver, it has
strong implications for all issues surrounding class action arbitration. It
presents a narrow interpretation of the FAA that seems to mark a step back
in the Court's stated policy of encouraging arbitration.
III. ANALYSIS
Each case presented above has taken a different approach in its
interpretation of class action issues in arbitration. For this reason, this
section will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each to establish a
cohesive approach for future courts to apply. The first section of Part III
will analyze the arguments in favor of upholding class action waivers. The
next section will explore the arguments in favor of invalidating class action
waivers. The final section of Part III will propose a four-factor analytical
framework for future cases.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1783.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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A. Arguments in Favor of Upholding Class Action Waivers
Both the FAA and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have expressed
a strong presumption in favor of the validity of arbitration agreements in
general.20' The Johnson court enforced the arbitration agreement at issue
exactly as it was written and agreed to by the parties, even though it did not
contain a class action waiver and was silent on the issue of class
arbitration.202 The Stolt court employed a very similar analysis.203 There are
three reasons why courts may want to follow this approach in future cases:
(1) the ease of application, (2) the legislative intent of the FAA, and (3)
minimal judicial role.
First, a per se rule upholding all class action waivers or denying class
actions when the agreement is silent on the issue would be simple and easy
to apply. It simplifies the court's role in the arbitration process and arguably
stays true to the principle that contracts should be enforced on their terms.
Thomas Wilmowski argues in favor of this approach in an article discussing
the validity of class action waivers.20 4  Wilmowski contends that courts
regularly enforce contracts of adhesion and should not apply special rules to
class action waivers.205 This approach puts class action waivers on the same
footing as all other contract terms and would invalidate a class action waiver
only when it found the arbitration agreement as a whole invalid.
Second, this approach seems truest to Congress's intent in enacting the
FAA because it embodies the strong presumption in favor of enforcing
arbitration agreements that Congress wished to achieve with the FAA.
Because Congress has expressed such a clear intent in favor of arbitration, it
can be argued that courts that invalidate class action waivers are dispensing
with congressional intent. However, the FAA is silent on the specific issue
of class arbitration, so some room is left for debate.206 The alternative
argument could be made that, as Justice Ginsburg suggests in her Stolt
dissent, class action waivers may make it impossible for consumers to
pursue small-dollar claims in any forum at all. This does not result in
201. See supra Part IIA-B; Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
202. Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3rd Cir. 2000).
203. Stolt, 130 S. Ct. at 1758.
204. Thomas Wilmowski, A Little Fish in a Big Sea: Should Consumer Protection Statutes
Override Class Arbitration Waivers?, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 313, 322.
205. Id.
206. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 366.
207. Stolt, 130 S. Ct. at 1776.
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more arbitrations as Congress intended with the FAA; rather, these claims
go nowhere at all. Wilmowski argues that if Congress wishes to take a
position on the issue, it should amend the FAA to either allow or prohibit
class action waivers.208
Third, the decisions by the courts in Johnson and Stolt fully embody a
judicial hands-off policy in the arena of arbitration agreement, which was
Congress' intent in enacting the FAA. 209  The Johnson court analyzed
Johnson's claims on an individual level and found that his rights would be
210no better vindicated in litigation than they would be in arbitration.
Because the arbitration agreement was also found to be valid and
enforceable, the court determined that proceeding with class litigation was
merely a procedural right that did not interfere with the vindication of
Johnson's personal statutory rights.21' The Stolt Court concluded that
because the parties did not manifest an intent to submit to class action
arbitration, an arbitration panel could not impose it upon them. 212 The merit
in this approach is in its simplicity and ease of application to cases with
varying fact scenarios.
B. Arguments in Favor ofInvalidating Class Action Waivers
Although there are several arguments in favor of upholding class action
waivers, there are also compelling arguments in favor of invalidating class
action waivers. The Discover Bank and Kristian cases taken together
represent a strong argument that class action waivers in arbitration
agreements may be unconscionable because they do not allow for the full
vindication of statutory rights.213 Unlike the court in Johnson, the court in
Discover Bank and Kristian viewed the class action waivers at issue as
waivers of substantive rights and not as waivers of procedural rights. In
viewing the agreements through this lens, the courts came to predictably
different conclusions than did the Johnson court.
The courts in Discover Bank and Kristian based their conclusions on
three main arguments. The first argument is that section 2 of the FAA
requires arbitration agreements to be invalidated if they violate state contract
principles.214 The second argument is that class action mechanisms have
208. Wilmowski, supra note 204, at 323.
209. Johnson, 225 F.3d 366 at 376.
210. See supra Part I.CI.
211. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 376.
212. See supra Part IID.
213. See supra Part II.C.2.a-b.
214. See supra Part II.C.2.a-b.
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important substantive implications and rights may not be fully vindicated in
their absence.215 The third argument is that class waivers should be severed
instead of invalidating the agreement as a whole.216
The courts' first argument is that section 2 of the FAA requires
arbitration agreements to be invalidated if they violate state contract
principles.217 This is a straightforward interpretation of the FAA, which
states that agreements to arbitrate should be enforceable "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."218
Although the act does represent a strong policy in favor of arbitration
generally, section 2 was written to provide relief to parties who entered into
an agreement that did not comply with state-law contract principles. Many
of the class action waivers discussed in this article were presented on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis by a large company with significantly greater bargaining
power than its customers.21 9 For this reason, courts have applied section 2 to
deem class action waivers of this nature unconscionable and therefore
unenforceable.220
The second argument, that class mechanisms are a substantive right,
focuses on real-world concerns instead of applying a strict construction of
arbitration agreements that were not freely bargained for. The argument,
relied upon in Discover Bank and Kristian, posits that even though class
mechanisms can be viewed as merely procedural mechanisms, substantive
rights can be violated without any remedy in their absence. 221 The Gilmer
decision has been criticized by the D.C. Circuit Court for placing too heavy
an emphasis on the procedural and substantive labels.222 The D.C. Circuit
Court concluded that substantive rights depend for their enforcement upon
the existence of at least minimal procedures.223 At a minimum, then,
"statutory rights include both a substantive protection and access to a neutral
forum in which to enforce those protections."224 A lopsided arbitration
215. See supra Part II.C.2.a-b.
216. See supra Part II.C.2.a-b.
217. See supra Part II.C.2.a-b.
218. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
219. See supra Part II.C.2.a-b.
220. See supra Part II.C.2.a-b.
221. See supra Part II.C.2.a-b.
222. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
223. Id. at 1482.
224. Id. (citing Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1246-48 (9th Cir. 1994);
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 144-45 (1983)).
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agreement that effectively waived the employee's ability to enforce the
statutory law would effectively waive the employee's substantive rights,
contrary to the Supreme Court's prescription in Gilmer.225
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that
arbitration is not a waiver of substantive rights-it is just an agreement to
have those rights resolved in a different forum.226 In the context of a group
of consumers each with a small dollar claim, being forced to arbitrate on an
individual rather than a class basis does require a waiver of substantive
rights. In that situation, there is no ability to pursue the claim at all.
Viewing the right to proceed as a class as substantive rather than
procedural creates a more flexible approach that allows courts to
meaningfully weigh the options of the potential class members. Both the
court in Discover Bank and the court in Kristian found that the plaintiffs'
statutory rights would effectively be left unaddressed if they were not
allowed to proceed on a class basis in some form.227 In taking a realistic
view of the individual facts of each case, the courts found that it would not
be economically feasible for the plaintiffs to proceed on an individual basis
for the following reasons: the high attorneys' and expert fees associated with
the type of claim involved, the low amount of actual damages, or some
combination of those and other factors.228
The third argument, that class waivers should be severed instead of
invalidating the agreement as a whole, also serves the purposes of the FAA
and minimizes judicial interference.229 Severing only an unconscionable
class action waiver while upholding the rest of the arbitration agreement is
consistent with the intent of the FAA to promote arbitration. 230 The courts in
Discover Bank and Kristian took pains not to invalidate the arbitration
agreements in their entirety; instead, the courts severed only those portions
incompatible with state contract principles. 231  This approach is attractive
because it evaluates claims on an individual basis and arguably produces a
more fair result.232
225. Id.
226. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490. U.S. 477, 481 (1989).
227. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Discover Bank v. Superior
Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109 (Cal. 2005).
228. See supra Part II.C.2.a-b.
229. See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1111.
230. Seeidatlll0-11.
231. See id. at 1104; Kristian, 446 F.3d at 61-62.
232. See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1104-05.
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C. Courts Should Apply a Multi-Factor Test to Determine the Validity of
Class Action Waivers
Although the Discover Bank and Kristian courts reached well-reasoned
results, both courts came to their conclusions in a piecemeal and inconsistent
way.233 In an article discussing the enforceability of class action waivers,
Heather Bromfield argues that all class action waivers should be invalidated
on principles of unconscionability. 234 However, this approach suffers from
many of the same defects as arguments in favor of blindly enforcing all class
action waivers. Invalidating all class action waivers would defeat the
purpose of arbitration-that two parties may contract to resolve their
disputes in a way that is mutually agreeable to them.235 If courts were to
simply invalidate every class action waiver, it would impose judicial
constraints on the subject matter of personal contracts, something that is
most certainly not the intention of the FAA. The best approach to take is not
all-or-nothing in either direction, but rather an easily applied test that can be
customized to the individual facts of a case while still maintaining consistent
results across the board.
The California Supreme Court case Gentry v. Superior Court provides a
solid framework of analysis that courts should apply in future challenges to
the validity of class action waivers.236 This framework applies the principles
of Discover Bank and Kristian in a more easily accessible and methodical
way by utilizing a set of four factors to determine the validity of class action
waivers in arbitration agreements.237
The first factor the Gentry court identified was the probable size of each
individual class member's recovery. 238 The smaller the individual recovery,
the less likely a person is to go through the hassle and expense of pursuing
arbitration on an individual level. 239 This factor can be easily applied to the
cases discussed in the pre-Stolt split. In Gilmer, the court found that
individual recovery in ADEA claims is typically substantial; therefore, it
was not a significant hindrance to proceed individually rather than on a
233. See generally id. at 100; Kristian, 446 F.3d at 25.
234. Heather Bromfield, The Denial of Relief The Enforcement of Class Action Waivers in
Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 315, 332 (2009).
235. See Kanowitz, supra note 3, at 255.
236. See Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 568-70 (Cal. 2007).
237. See id. at 560-70.
238. Id. at 564.
239. See id at 561.
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classwide basis. 240  In Discover Bank and Kristian, the arbitration
agreements at issue arose from consumer contracts between creditors and
their customers.2 4' These cases involved allegations that the creditor's
practices were unfair to all of their customers, but no single customer
incurred substantial monetary loss. 24 2 In these cases, the court found that the
likely small recovery for individual claimants would not outweigh the hassle
and expense of proceeding on an individual basis.243 A similar situation
occurred in Stolt, but between parties to a shipping contract rather than a
244consumer transaction.
The second factor the Gentry court identified was the potential for
retaliation against members of the class.245 Because Gentry was an
employment case, the court considered whether an individual who
proceeded against his employer alone would face more potential future
retaliation than a group of employees who proceeded together.246 Although
this does not directly parallel the consumer credit context, consumers could
reasonably contemplate retaliation against them either by having credit
revoked or being unable to secure future loans. It would seem significantly
less likely that these negative consequences would materialize if the
plaintiffs had the benefit of proceeding as a class. This could also occur in
the shipping context, as presented in Stolt. If one shipping company is
engaging in allegedly anti-competitive practices and only one of its
customers challenges it in arbitration, that customer could simply be
blacklisted by the shipper. However, if all of the company's customers were
able to proceed as a class, the company would be forced to comply with the
law or face losing all of its business.
The third Gentry factor to be considered is whether potential class
members exist that may be "unaware that their legal rights have been
violated." 247 The court reasoned that if there are people who are unaware
that their rights have been violated, they might never get a remedy in the
absence of a class action because they will never know to pursue an
individual claim.248 This factor can be applied in even more consumer credit
situations than employment situations. Particularly in the cases of Kristian
240. See supra Part II.C. 1.
241. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2006); Discover Bank v. Superior
Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005).
242. See Kristian, 446 F.3d at 58; Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1122.
243. See supra Part II.C.2.a-b.
244. See supra Part II.D.
245. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 565 (Cal. 2007).
246. See id. at 579.
247. Id. at 566.
248. Id. at 566-67.
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and Discover Bank, the defendant companies engaged in practices that
affected all or nearly all of their customers.249 Most likely, a large portion of
those customers had no knowledge that their rights were being violated.
Similarly in Stolt, the shipping company's customers may not all have been
aware of the anti-competitive practices that were driving up shipping costs.
If the arbitrators had determined that potential class members did exist, they
could have ordered that class representatives give notice to all potential class
members, which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires in traditional
litigation, before commencing class arbitration. 250
The fourth factor that Gentry identifies acts as a catchall for any other
circumstances that the individual facts of a case might present. The court
described this fourth category as "other real world obstacles to the
vindication of a class members' rights."251 These real world obstacles are
likely to include those discussed in the circuit split cases, such as the amount
of attorney's fees associated with bringing an individual claim, the cost to
hire expert witnesses, and the public policy goals of the statute that the
plaintiff argues was violated. This fourth category presents a flexible way
for the court to consider circumstances that are not easily addressed by rigid
rules and formulas, and it could tip the scale either in favor of or against
procession as a class.
Each of these factors should be considered in light of the statutory
requirements of the FAA and the individual statute at issue in the case. By
no means should a court fashion its own version of justice by ignoring the
relevant statutory requirements. These factors are meant to aid the court in
its interpretation of section 2 of the FAA and the overall legislative intent of
both the FAA and the statute at issue in a case.
In addition to the application of the four Gentry factors, courts should
always seek to uphold the portions of the arbitration agreement that do not
violate state contract law. For this reason, it is unlikely that courts will face
many situations where proceeding with class litigation is appropriate. Only
in situations where the court finds the entire arbitration agreement
unenforceable should the court allow a group of plaintiffs to proceed with a
class action in court. Instead, in most situations, the court will determine
whether or not to sever an unconscionable class arbitration waiver from an
249. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Discover Bank v. Superior Court,
113 P.3d I100 (Cal. 2005).
250. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2).
251. Gentry, 165 P.3d at 567.
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otherwise valid arbitration agreement. In those situations, the court should
apply the Gentry factors. If it determines that class arbitration would be the
only way to fully vindicate the rights of the plaintiffs, and that individual
arbitration would give the plaintiffs less-comprehensive vindication of their
rights, it should sever the class action waiver and compel arbitration on a
classwide basis.
IV. PROPOSED FAA AMENDMENT
Although the multi-factor framework will provide courts with a way to
fairly and lawfully settle class arbitration issues, it is only a band-aid for a
larger problem. The FAA does not currently contain any provision
addressing class action issues in arbitration.252 To fully correct the problem
presented by this article, Congress should amend the FAA to include a
provision addressing these issues. This provision should accomplish three
goals. First, it should establish class action arbitration as an accepted mode
of arbitration under the FAA. Second, it should provide instruction to
parties and courts on how to interpret class action waivers. Third, it should
set a standard for arbitration agreements that are silent on the issue of class
arbitration.
A. What the Amendment Should Accomplish
The proposed amendment should be added to the end of Chapter One as
section 17 of the FAA. The first subsection should contain a general
statement endorsing class arbitration and providing a procedural structure for
arbitrators to follow. This section would be the foundation for courts and
parties to point to when seeking to proceed with class arbitration. It would
also allow class arbitration to be conducted in a uniform manner, thus
avoiding the need for judicial review of procedural mechanisms.
The second subsection would address how courts and arbitrators should
interpret varying class action waivers. This section should be broken down
into agreements between sophisticated bargaining parties and contracts of
adhesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. For parties that are
sophisticated business entities or for individuals who engage in meaningful
bargaining, the waiver should be upheld. This flows from the principle
emphasized in Stolt that arbitration is fundamentally founded upon the
consent of two parties.253
252. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
253. Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int'1 Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
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The rules for contracts of adhesion should be considerably more
flexible. The amendment should give arbitrators discretion to allow or deny
class arbitration based on the four Gentry factors. Because contracts of
adhesion are not freely bargained for, class action waivers could potentially
disadvantage parties to the point of extinguishing their claims entirely.
Contracts of adhesion are typically found in consumer transactions between
a large business entity and its several customers. If the business perpetrates
a small fraud on all of its customers, it could profit greatly in the aggregate
while only disadvantaging each customer minimally. This leaves the
customer in the position of mounting a potentially costly action against the
company to recover a comparably small amount. In these situations, class
actions are necessary to vindicate the rights of any of the wronged
consumers. Here, the proposed amendment should presume the
unconscionability of the waiver and adopt the four Gentry factors. The
arbitral panel should decide whether an application of the Gentry factors
overcomes the presumption of unconscionability. If the presumption of
unconscionability is overcome, the class action waiver should be upheld. If
the presumption is not overcome, the class action waiver should be severed
from the agreement, leaving intact as much of the agreement as remains
conscionable. This process would be consistent with principles of section 2
of the FAA, allowing arbitration agreements to be invalidated if they violate
basic state contract principles.254
The third section of the proposed FAA amendment should provide
guidance for arbitration agreements that are silent with respect to class
arbitration. Here, the arbitrator should be required to determine whether the
arbitration agreement was freely bargained for or presented as a contract of
adhesion. Then, the arbitrator should analyze each of the four Gentry
factors, but without the presumption of unconscionability that is in place for
class action waivers. This section of the amendment should seek to uphold
the arbitration agreement as written as much as possible, only departing
from it if justice so requires.
B. Proposed Language
The amendment should contain the following provisions:
254. Federal Arbitration Act § 2.
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§ 17. Class Arbitration
(a) Class arbitration is an acceptable mode of arbitration under this Act.
The procedure for class arbitration shall be the same as the procedure
proscribed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The decision of
whether and when to move forward with arbitration shall be made only
by the arbitrator. Only upon complete resolution of the class arbitration
process may a decision of the arbitrator be appealed to a court pursuant
to § 16 of this Act.
(b) Class action waivers
(1) Class action waivers that are freely bargained for between
sophisticated parties shall be upheld on their terms.
(2) Class actions waivers presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as
part of a contract of adhesion will be presumed to be unenforceable.
Arbitrators shall apply the following four factors to determine if the
presumption of unenforceability is overcome:
(i) the probable size of each class member's individual recovery,
(ii) the potential for retaliation against members of the class,
(iii) whether potential class members may be unaware that their
rights have been violated,
(iv) real world obstacles to the full vindication of rights by class
members.
(3) If after applying the four factors listed in (b)(2)(i)-(iv), the
arbitrators find that the presumption of unenforceability has been
overcome, the class action waiver shall be upheld. If the arbitrators
find that the presumption of unenforceability has not been overcome,
the arbitrators shall deem the class action waiver unenforceable,
sever it from the arbitration agreement, and enforce the remaining
conscionable portions of the agreement.
(c) Arbitration agreements silent on the issue of class actions
(1) When an arbitration agreement is silent on the issue of class
actions, arbitrators shall determine whether the arbitration agreement
was freely bargained for or presented as a contract of adhesion.
(2) Once the determination in (c)(1) is made, arbitrators shall apply
the factors listed in (b)(2)(i)-(iv), but without the presumption of
unenforceability.
(3) Arbitrators shall determine whether to allow or deny class
arbitration based on the factors listed in (b)(2)(i)-(iv).
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has highlighted the split of authority between circuit courts
on the issue of class action waivers in arbitration agreements. The April
2010 Supreme Court case Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International did
little to resolve this split of authority, and it actually obfuscated the issue
even further.255 Class action waivers in arbitration agreements can come in
many forms, and some agreements do not contain them at all. These
inconsistencies in language and form may be a large part of the reason courts
have held so inconsistently on their validity. Some courts have allowed
class action waivers to be invalidated under section 2 of the FAA, which
disavows any agreement that does not comport with basic contract principles
such as unconscionability.256 Others have found that class mechanisms are
merely procedural and can be waived in a valid agreement to arbitrate.257
By applying the Gentry factors enumerated above and with the
enactment of the proposed FAA amendment, courts will have more
definitive guidelines to aid in their interpretation of class action waivers. By
severing a class action waiver that does not comport with the factorial
analysis instead of invalidating the entire arbitration agreement, courts will
continue to serve the statutory purposes of the FAA without sacrificing state
contract principles applicable to all contracts. This approach provides courts
with a meaningful framework of analysis that remains within the bounds of
both federal and state law while also allowing for more consistent judicial
treatment of class action waivers in the future.
255. See generally Stolt, 130 S. Ct. at 1758.
256. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Gentry, 165 P.3d at 556;
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
257. See Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3rd Cir. 2000).
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